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THE EXPERIMENT AL USE EXCEPTION TO PA TENT
INFRINGEMENT: DO UNIVERSITIES
DESERVE SPECIAL TREATMENT?
Elizabeth A. Rowe•

I. INTRODUCTION

Inventor Ivan owns a patent on a new Gizmo. He has spent a substantial portion
of his time and resources to develop the Gizmo. He has also spent thousands of dollars
on his patent attorneys to obtain the patent. Ivan had to wait over two years for the
patent application to be processed and approved. But it was all worth it. Our patent
laws grant Ivan a negative right-the right to exclude others from practicing his
invention during the period of the patent. 1
The local university is using Ivan's invention to further its own research. The
university's research will allow the university to train many graduate students and
could potentially result in large profits for the university. The university did not seek
Ivan's permission to use the Gizmo. Should the university be liable to Ivan for patent
infringement? Whether Ivan can prevail depends on whether the university can claim
its unauthorized use of the Gizmo is permitted under the experimental use exception.
The experimental use exception 2 is a common law exception to the patent-holder's
exclusive right ofuse. 3 It permits the use ofanother's patented device when such use
is for philosophical inquiry, curiosity, or amusement. 4 Judging from the scholarship on
this topic to date, most commentators would probably answer the question posed by

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. This Article originally
appeared in the Hastings Law Journal. Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment? 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006). It is republished
here with permission of that journal as a contribution to the Maine Law Review's Closing in on Open
Science Symposium. The author is very grateful to Jonathan Cohen, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, William Page,
and Sharon Rush for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. She would also like to thank Jennifer
Coleman, Jocelyn Crocci, and Luke Napodano for their research assistance.
I. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (granting patent rights for twenty years from the filing date of the
patent application); see also id. § 271 (2000). "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." Id. § 27l(a).
2. There is another experimental use defense in patent law, also known as the public use defense, that
forbids an inventor from obtaining a patent on an invention if the invention was in public use or on sale
(rather than being used for experimental purposes by the inventor) for more than a year prior to the date of
the patent application. Id. § I 02(b ). It covers experimentation conducted by the inventor himself on the
invention. This Article does not address that defense. Rather, it examines the common law experimental
use exception where the courts determine other people's alleged experimental use of the patentee's
invention.
3. Experimental use is considered both an exception and a defense to patent infringement. See Janice
M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement
for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH.L. REV. I, 19-21 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also infra
Part II.
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the hypothetical in the negative: the university should not be liable to Ivan for patent
infringement. This Article, however, rejects such an answer and asserts that the
university should be liable.

A. The Outcry from Madey
The experimental use exception has recently come under attack by many who
consider it too narrow. 5 They fear that the courts' "narrowing" of the experimental use
exception will stifle research and innovation. 6 Much of the discontent with the doctrine
has been spurred by a relatively recent Federal Circuit opinion, Madey v. Duke
University, which makes clear that a research university does not receive immunity
under the experimental use exception when its researchers engage in research or
conduct experiments using patented inventions. 7 This ruling has created an outcry
because over the years universities appear to have assumed, albeit incorrectly, that their
research was protected under the doctrine and thus that their scientists need not seek
permission from patent owners before using patented devices. 8
Virtually all commentators since Madey have criticized the ruling and its effect on
the experimental use exception. 9 For instance, one commentator calls it "a seemingly
disingenuous opinion that neither conforms to the implications of precedent nor
explains the reasons for steering the law in a different direction, but pretends that prior
courts never meant to give research science special treatment." 10 Similarly, another
commentator asserts that the Madey court "stretched the concept of commercial use"
and that the current experimental use exception "bears little relation to the implications
ofa particular experimental use for the public benefits of follow-on innovation." 11

B. A Narrow Experimental Use Exception Makes Sense
This Article enters the discussion to offer a different and opposing viewpoint. It
takes the position that a narrow experimental use exception is consistent with existing
law, consistent with sound public policy, and appropriate for the current nature of
university research. Contrary to the picture painted by critics of a rapid "narrowing"
of the exception by the courts, in reality, the experimental use exception has always
been very narrow. To the extent that universities or others have taken liberties with a
broader interpretation of the doctrine, the holding inMadey serves simply as a wake-up
call clarifying the status of the law. Having moved from a philosophical

5. See, e.g., Andrew J. Caruso, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's
View, 14 ALB.L.J. SCI. & TECH. 215,220 (2003); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution
to the Problem Arising From Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARACOMPUTER& HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347, 365-66 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?: Experimental Use
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004); Kevin Sandstrom, Note, How Much Do We Value
Research and Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light
o/lntegra Lifesciences Ltd. v. Merck, 30 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. I 059, I 067 (2004).

6. See, e.g., id.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Matley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see infra Part 11.B.2.
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018, 1019 (2003).
See supra note 5.
Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1019.
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46.
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experimentation model closer to a business for-profit model in research, it is important
to consider the fairness of treating universities' patent infringement differently from
that of their industry counterparts.
C. The New Face of University Research

The proper role for the experimental use exception at research universities is a
complex issue with no easy answer. The main reason for the complexity lies in the
changed nature of university research during the last two decades. University research
used to be more akin to research for the sake of research, with university researchers
engaged in their academic pursuits, anxious to publish their discoveries. Today the
landscape has changed. University research has become more ofa business, and indeed
is sometimes difficult to distinguish from industrial research. Patenting, commercial
development, high tech incubators, and partnerships with industry have become
commonplace activities for universities.
The legal problem posed by the experimental use exception cannot be divorced
from this context. To the extent Madey is viewed as posing a problem for university
research, any consideration ofa solution must be mindful of this shift in the nature of
university research. It is not the old image of university research that should govern,
but today's reality. Admittedly, this poses some tensions because it may be challenging
to reconcile the purely academic norms and interests of university research with the
profit-oriented, businesslike activity it is today. The former may deserve a broader
experimental use exception, and perhaps that is why most critics of the doctrine,
impliedly viewing university research from the "old" lens, disagree with Madey.
However, this Article posits that the better approach entails reviewing the situation
through the newer lens in determining the appropriate rule for patent infringement in
university research.
A noteworthy irony underlies this issue: universities probably have much more to
gain from the strict and narrow interpretation of the patent laws espoused in this Article
than from the alternative (yet more vocal) viewpoint. That is because universities as
a group are large patent-holders in this country. 12 They gain billions of dollars in
revenues annually from patent licenses and royalties. 13 Any interpretation of the
experimental use exception, or the patent laws generally, that would in effect permit
greater erosion of patent-holders' rights would impose greater financial detriment to
universities than the narrow interpretation under Madey.
D. The Tradeojf Between Patent Protection and Incentives to Innovate

The overarching theoretical question here concerns the tradeoff between
protecting patentees' rights and maintaining incentives to innovate. It is of course
difficult to determine the optimal level of patent protection for increasing invention and
innovation. In the context of the experimental use exception, this Article posits that a
narrow experimental use exception will have a more positive effect on incentives to
innovate than will a broader exception. A narrow experimental use exception, the

12. See infra text accompanying note 115.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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status quo, strengthens incentives to invent and innovate, while a broad experimental
use exception would provide disincentives to invest in patenting and innovation. This
is especially so given the nature of modem university research and existing patent
licensing practices.

E. The Reality of the Marketplace
Contrary to virtually all those who have written about the experimental use
exception since Madey, I do not see the Madey opinion as the death knell of all
research and innovation. A closer look at the practical reality reveals that several
considerations inherent in the business of university research are likely to have a more
powerful effect on the enforcement of the experimental use exception among
researchers than the Madey decision. These considerations provide a kind of selfregulation that will continue to foster research and innovation.
Moreover, this Article examines two other considerations, not previously
considered in combination by other commentators, which in effect already expand the
experimental use exception, affording greater protection to universities where
applicable. First, a recent United States Supreme Court opinion, Merck KGaA v.
lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 14 broadly interpreted a federal statute, permitting
experimentation on patented drugs prior to expiration of their patents. 15 Thus,
university research involving development of new drugs benefits from this ruling.
Second, state universities enjoy sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits for
damages, giving them far greater protection than any experimental use exception could
provide. 16
These gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the doctrine, rather than
leaving it as an empty shell. The experimental use exception is still of consequence to
private universities, individual researchers at state universities, industrial researchers,
and the world of non-drug development researchers. Because each chip off the doctrine
signals a further erosion of patent-holders' rights and an accompanying harm to the
incentives to invent and innovate, careful consideration of the doctrine is still required.
In order to make the exclusive rights granted to a patent owner truly meaningful,
not only must the infringement laws be strictly observed, but exceptions must remain
narrow as well. To do otherwise would threaten to erode those rights. Not only is
broadening the exception a step on a slippery slope, but any such broadening can also
be very difficult to identify and manage, and can threaten to swallow the exception.
In some circumstances, however, strict adherence to the experimental use
exception may stifle experimentation. As a result, any broadening of the exception
should be defined by Congress in specific situations where a sufficiently compelling
case has been made that the exclusivity granted to a patent owner will have an injurious
effect on the public good and on innovation. Thus, under these circumstances, society's
interests should trump the inventor's patent rights.
Part II of this Article provides background on the experimental use exception. Part
III discusses the Bayh-Dole Act, its alteration of the landscape of university research,

14. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
15. Id. at 208; see infra Part II.C.2.
16. See infra Part IV.C.4.
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and its impact on university patenting activity. Part IV explains why, in reality,
university research will survive a narrow experimental use exception. Finally, Part V
discusses why the experimental use exception is appropriately narrow and proposes a
test that ought to guide Congress in deciding when legislative broadening is necessary.
IL BACKGROUND ON THE EXCEPTION

The experimental use exception is a judicially created doctrine that limits a patentholder's exclusive rights. 17 The highlights of its evolution and its current status in the
case law (and legislatively) are described below. 18 It is important to realize that the
exception was intended to be narrow from the beginning. In Whittemore v. Cutter, 19 the
first case to apply the exception, Justice Joseph Story, ruling for the defendant,
declared in dicta that the patent laws did not intend to punish a person who infringes
a patent "merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects." 20 Accordingly, given the
broad prohibition against any use of a patented invention without permission, the task
entailed carving out a sliver of use that would not invade the patent-holder's exclusive
rights. For Justice Story, this sliver included use for purely philosophical inquiry and
use for determining whether the patented device works as it proclaims.
Further testimony to the exception's narrowness is the rare success of the
defense. 21 It appears that over time, the focus of the inquiry shifted from whether the
alleged infringing use was for profit or financial gain to whether it furthered one's
legitimate business interests (regardless of profit). However, the courts never wavered
from their extremely narrow interpretation of the doctrine. When that narrow
interpretation was judicially applied to the pharmaceutical industry, Congress stepped
in to provide the industry with special relief. 22 The Supreme Court's interpretation of
that congressional act may now have the effect of expanding the common law
experimental use exception in certain circumstances.

17. See Mueller, supra note 3, at 19.
18. For a listing of more of the older cases on the doctrine, see generally 5-16 DONALDS. CHISUM,
CHISUMONPATENTS§ 16.03 (2004).
19. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
20. Id. at 1121.
21. Indeed, a review of cases reveals that the defense has defeated a patent infringement claim in only
four instances and without much discussion from the courts on the reasons for such defeat. See Chesterfield
v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371,376 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (finding the experimental use exception applicable
when alloy was used only for testing and for experimental purposes); Dugan v. Lear Avia, 55 F. Supp. 223,
229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding one device non-infringing under the experimental use exception because it
was not manufactured for sale); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va.
1937) (finding experimental use exception applicable when testing was done before going into commercial
production); Finney v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33, 35 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975) (finding the
experimental use exception applicable where NASA used patented glove once during training experiment).
The low number of successful cases utilizing the defense may also be attributable to patentees simply
choosing not to sue those infringers whose activities are truly experimental within the narrow boundaries
provided by the courts. As this Article suggests, there is a self-regulating mechanism in place that guides
enforcement of the experimental use exception. See infra Part N.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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A. Profit or Financial Gain
The earliest cases creating the experimental use exception arose in the commercial
context, involving businesses. It would not be until a century later that a case involving
an academic institution, albeit indirectly, would arise, 23 and then another sixty-five
years would pass before Madey v. Duke University24 would specifically address
academic institutions. This trend is notable in the context of the arguments made here
because it demonstrates how rarely universities have confronted a legal battle on this
issue. The timing also seems significant insofar as the most recent ruling arrived after
the courts shifted the focus of their analysis from a profit or financial gain inquiry to
a broader furtherance of ongoing business interests determination. Accordingly, even
knowing nothing else about the case law, one would have expected (perhaps more
easily in hindsight) the Madey court to rule as it did.
Originally, the courts focused on whether the alleged infringer intended to profit
from the use of another's patent. If he did, the experimental use exception did not
apply. Ever present throughout these early discussions was consideration of the effect
on the patentee's exclusive rights. In Sawin v. Guild,25 Justice Story again applied the
experimental use exception to exempt alleged patent infringers who had no profit
motive. 26 Finding for the defendant, he concluded that those who use the patented
invention "for mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and
exactness of the specification" describing the invention, would not be held liable for
patent infringement. 27 Drawing the line at the intent to profit made sense to this court
because only those who infringe patents with the intent to profit financially actually
deprive the patent owner of his "lawful rewards" preserved by the patent. 28
Accordingly, this case established the profit motive as the key determinant of whether
the experimental use exception would exempt the alleged infringing activity. 29
About fifty years later, in 1861, another court set out the current test for
experimental use in Poppenhusen v. Falke. 30 The court clarified that courts had
accepted the experimental use defense when the alleged infringing activity was "for the
sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement." 31
This test formed the current "truly narrow" experimental use exception, immunizing
only those patent infringers seeking amusement or verifying that the invention worked
as it should-not those motivated by financial gain.
In 1935, with Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co.,32 the first case involving
the experimental use exception in the academic research context was decided.
However, the defendant in Ruth was not an academic institution; rather, the defendant
company illegally sold parts for a patented flotation device to several customers,

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
Mueller, supra note 3, at 20.
19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
Id.
13 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D. Colo. 1935), rev 'don other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (I 0th Cir. 1936).
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including the Colorado School of Mines. 33 Customers who purchased these parts were
34
able to use the improved device instead of purchasing a new instrument. Although
finding the defendant liable for contributory patent infringement, the district court
exempted the sales to the Colorado School of Mines because the school used its
instruments in conducting research. 35
Consistent with its financial gain analysis, the court reasoned that because the
school derived no financial benefit from the use of the patented device, its infringing
research activities fell within the experimental use exception. 36 Academic institutions
have interpreted this decision as providing them with broad protection from patent
infringement when they engage in research. Indeed, most academic institutions freely
infringed patents until 2002, when the Federal Circuit clarified the scope of the
exemption in Madey. 37
B. Furthering Business Interests
I. Experimental Use and the Pharmaceutical Industry

The experimental use analysis soon shifted, considering not just the alleged
infringer's profit motive but also whether the use occurred in the course of business.
Accompanying this shift was the recognition that any use (not just profitable use) of
the patentee's exclusive rights was harmful and in violation of patent laws. That
rationale is clear in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,38 in which the
Federal Circuit applied the experimental use exception to the pharmaceutical
industry. 39 Bolar used Roche's patented drug compound to develop a generic version
of one of Roche's drugs. 40 Bolar was required by law to delay manufacturing the
generic drug until Roche's patent expired; however, Bolar began the drug testing
process (which sometimes takes several years) before the patent's expiration in order
41
to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Bolar argued that
its testing ofRoche's drug during that period was purely experimental, but the Federal
Circuit disagreed and held that Bolar infringed Roche's patents-Bolar would not be
saved by the experimental use exception. 42
According to the Federal Circuit, Bolar's use of the patented drug during testing
violated the plain meaning of "use" in the Patent Act. 43 The court noted that use of a
patented invention alone, without a showing that the patent-holder suffered damage or
44
lost sales, was sufficient to make out a case of patent infringement. The fact that

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 699.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 713.
307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003);see infra Part II.B.2.
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 863
Id. at 860.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 86 I.
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Bolar's activities, at the time of the lawsuit, caused no financial loss to Roche (since
the drug had not been marketed or sold) was not sufficient to afford it immunity under
the experimental use exception. 45 Rather, the court noted Bolar's intent to profit in the
future, a disqualification from experimental use protection. 46
It seemed important to the Roche court that Bolar' s drug testing activity fell within
its ordinary course of business. 47 The court noted that Bolar's use was "solely for
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry." 48 The court held that "unlicensed experiments conducted with
a view to the adoption of the patented invention to the experimenter's business is a
violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented
invention." 49 This language and focus on the "ordinary course ofbusiness" would later
prove important in the Madey decision applying the experimental use exception to
academic institutions. The Roche court emphasized that it would not allow infringing
activities to be masked as experimental use when such activities have "definite,
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. " 50 The court noted the lack of
precedential support for permitting infringing activities that contributed to the
infringers' business interests. 51
The Federal Circuit again reaffirmed the "very narrow" scope of the experimental
use exception in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp. 52 The plaintiff, Embrex,
was the exclusive licensee of a patented machine for vaccinating chicks before they
hatched. 53 Defendant Service Engineering designed a similar machine. 54 In defending
against the patent infringement claim by Embrex, Service Engineering argued that its
activities merely involved testing its own machine. 55 Holding Service Engineering
liable for patent infringement, the court found these tests were conducted "expressly
for commercial purposes" and did not fit within the "very narrow" experimental use
exemption. 56
The court reiterated that the experimental use exception would only apply to
activities done "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or strictly philosophical
inquiry" and would not apply to any use conducted under the "guise of scientific
inquiry." 57 Additional clarification on the meaning of that phrase would arrive two
years later in a case against Duke University. 58

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 863.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1349-50.
Id.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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2. Madey v. Duke University: Laying Down the Law for Universities
This case is significant, in part, because it was the first infringement decision by
the Federal Circuit that held an academic research institution liable for infringement
for using a patented technology in the course of its own research. 59 Indeed, many
commentators believe the court rendered the exception worthless to academic
institutions. 60 I believe the case is also significant because it was the first patent
infringement action against an academic institution to reach the Federal Circuit. 61
The Federal Circuit in Madey found Duke University liable for patent
infringement when Duke continued to use Professor Madey's patented laser after he
left the university. 62 The trial court had held that Duke's use of the patented laser for
basic scientific research was not aimed at commercial ventures and was thus exempted
under the experimental use exception. 63 However, the Federal Circuit held that Duke's
own patent policies verified the use of the laser as furthering its "legitimate business
objectives." 64 The court refused to adopt the trial court's broad interpretation of the
experimental use exception as applying to any research for academic, experimental, or
non-profit purposes. 65
The court explained that Duke's status as a non-profit institution was not
determinative, since such academic institutions frequently conduct research with little
or no commercial value. 66 Rather, the court focused on Duke's "legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty," and the
university's research which "increase[s] the status of the institution and lure[s]
lucrative research grants, students and faculty." 67
Indeed, the court characterized Duke as a business and all research done at the
university as Duke's line of business, thus removing the research-and any patent
infringement that occurs in the research-from the experimental use exception. 68 This
focus on whether the activity furthered the alleged infringer's legitimate business
interests is not new; rather, it is entirely consistent with prior opinions. For instance,
as early as 1974, the Court of Federal Claims, 69 ruling on patent infringement cases
against the U.S. government's use of allegedly infringing aircraft, found that the
experimental use exception did not apply because the use furthered the legitimate
business of the using agency. 70

59. Id. at 1361---63.
60. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1019.
61. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
62. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361---63.
63. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426-28 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
64. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
65. Id. at 1361---62.
66. Id. at 1362.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The United States Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement
actions against the U.S. government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
70. See Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 176-77 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974); see also
lnfigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (refusing to apply
experimental use exception to exempt defendant's cloning experiments because "they were done as part of
the ongoing business activities of defendant .... "); Pitcairn v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35, 47
(Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975).
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Moreover, the court viewed Duke's own policies regarding the patenting of
research conducted at the university as part of its business objective. 71 Duke was, to the
court, "not shy" about attaining licenses for its patented work; such licensing revenue
contributed to Duke's "legitimate business." 72 There seemed to be an implication that
Duke intended to profit from the laser at some point in the future. The court pointed
out that some of the key evidence in the case was dismissed by the district court,
including a statement from Duke's laser lab web site that expressed interest in
corporate partnerships and Duke's establishment of an hourly fee for any non-academic
laser users. 73 The Madey decision is seen as effectively precluding academic
institutions from using the experimental use exception. 74
C. The Hatch-Waxman Act: Legislature Overturns Roche

The Roche decision caused an uproar because of the perceived damaging
implications for generic drug makers and ultimately for consumers. If generic drugs
could not be tested during the life of the patented drug, they would not be able to reach
the market until years after the expiration of the patent term on the pioneer drug. 75
Congress stepped in to overturn Roche, enacting the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 76

1. Description of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a codified version of the experimental use exception
for the pharmaceutical industry. 77 The statute, in relevant part, provides that it is not
"an act of [patent] infringement to ... use ... a patented invention ... solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the ... use ... of drugs .... " 78 The Act provides a safe harbor,
permitting drug manufacturers to perform experiments needed to obtain FDA approval
of their drugs, even if those experiments are conducted during the patent life of a
patented drug being tested-an otherwise infringing use. 79 In addition, the Act
lengthens the patent term for drugs requiring FDA approval before entering the
market. 80 It also exempts certain activities that would otherwise amount to
infringement. 81
The Act is intended to achieve some balance between the competing interests of
the patent-holder on the one hand and those of the generic drug maker on the other. It
grants an extension to the original patent-holder's patent term, since several years of

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
Abbott
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 n.7.
Id. at 1363 n.7.
Id. at 1356 n.5.
See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at I 019.
A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer drug. See
Lab. v. Zenith Lab., Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (N.D. lll. 1995).
Mueller, supra note 3, at 25.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(l) (2000).
Id.
Id.§§ 156,271.
Id.
Id.
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the patent's original term were lost during the FDA approval process and before the
drug entered the market. 82 In exchange, generic drug manufacturers may use the
original patented drug during testing, permitting the drug to complete the FDA
approval process and be ready for market release as soon as the original patent
expires. 83 The Act provides that making, using, or selling a patented invention "solely
for uses reasonably related" to gathering data in order to acquire approval under the
federal laws that regulate drug manufacture, use, or sale is not an act of patent
infringement. 84
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to cover more than drugs; it also
covers testing of medical devices, which, like pharmaceuticals, are subject to a lengthy
FDA approval process. 85 The Court reasoned that the sections of the Act are
complementary in that all of the products eligible for a patent term extension under
86
section 201 of the Act are also subject to section 202 's exemption for early testing.
Thus, medical devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs,
infant formula, 87 and human biological products (all of which are subject to pre-market
approval by the FDA) are covered under the testing exemption. 88 Accordingly, patentholders of both drugs and medical devices must tolerate the infringing activities of
competitors who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the patent
terms.89
2. The Supreme Court Interprets the Hatch-Waxman Act
Recently, in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences L Ltd., 90 the U.S. Supreme Court
considered early pre-clinical studies conducted by Merck that were not ultimately
included in' submissions to the FDA. 91 The Court held these studies exempt under the
safe harbor provision. 92 The Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit, 93 which
had reasoned that the experiments did not receive safe harbor protection because they
had not been included in FDA submissions and constituted merely "general biomedical
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds." 94
The Supreme Court noted that early in the experimentation and testing process,
it is difficult to ascertain what will ultimately be submitted to the FDA because of the
trial and error inherent in the process. 95 The exception is generic drugs, because it is
known at the outset that a particular compound, which is identical-to the drug already

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.§ 271(e)(I).
Id. See generally 5 DONALDS.CHISUM,CHISUMONPATENTS,§ 16.03[1] (2004).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
See Eli Lilly& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,671 (1990).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 674 n.6.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 673.
545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Merck, 545 U.S. at 206.
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approved, will be submitted to the FDA.96 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the rule espoused by the Federal Circuit would limit the safe harbor to generics
only, an interpretation that the Court rejected. 97 Instead, the Court focused on the
phrase "reasonably related," interpreting it broadly to cover all activity that one
intending to develop a particular drug has a reasonable basis for believing may be
included in a submission to the FDA ifsuccessful. 98 The fact that the experiment may
prove unsuccessful is not relevant. 99
While the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of section 271(e)(l)
represents a victory for those wishing to conduct testing in order to obtain regulatory
approval before the expiration of a patent, the ruling will likely have a negative effect
on drug research patents. Arguably, these research patents will lose most, if not all, of
their commercial value. 100
III. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH
Historically, the federal government owned all rights to research sponsored by
federal funds; such research typically was not patented because it was considered
"public research." 101 While "public research" was immediately and freely available to
the public, "commercial research" funded by private investment was kept secret until
patented and able to generate revenue by license. 102 Congress recognized that the
collaboration between scientific research and business would allow rapid and efficient
commercial development of basic research. 103
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent
Procedures Act (the "Bayh-Dole Act"), which allowed private ownership of patented
inventions resulting from research funded by the federal govemment. 104 It permitted
universities, small businesses, and nonprofit institutions to hold patents on the
inventions they generated with public money. 105 Its purpose was to accelerate the
development of inventions that would benefit the public. 106 The federal government
retained some rights to the inventions, but assigned most of its property rights to the

96. Id.
91. Id.
98. Id. at 206-07. The Court articulated its test as follows: "At least where a drugmaker has a
reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process,
to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would
be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related' to the 'development
and submission of information under ... Federal law."' Id. at 207.
99. Id.
100. If one can infringe drug research patents without consequence, and there is no other use for these
patented tools, then there is virtually no incentive for one to invest in obtaining these patents. See Brief for
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15-19, Merck
KGaA v. lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237) [hereinafter Wisconsin Amicus
Brief].
IOI. See Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v.
Cel/Pro March-In Rights Controversy, 8 TEX.INTELL.PROP.L.J. 211, 211-12 (2000).
102. Id. at 212.
103. Id. at 213.
104. 35 u.s.c.§§ 200-212 (2000).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 200.
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research labs. 107 This Act recognizes the great public value of allowing academic
institutions to pursue commercial development of their federally funded research. 108
The Act has fueled a major change with respect to universities and patents. As one
commentator notes, "universities have become players in the patent system in a way
that could hardly have been imagined before the Bayh-Dole Act." 109
A. Changes in Attitude About University Discoveries

Money changes everything. That phrase encapsulates the new trend in university
research. The fact that university research now had commercial value ushered in a new
attitude toward research and patenting. While at one time the premise was that basic
research should be freely available to everyone, now that discoveries could have
commercial value and financial rewards, it became more important to treat research as
private property. 110 Additionally, before the Bayh-Dole Act, federally sponsored
university research generally required the assignment of patents to the government and
free licensing to all those interested. 111 Now, however, universities could keep royalties
and licensing fees. As a result, a stream of revenue arrived at a time when government
funds for research were decreasing and universities' need for additional funding was
increasing. 112 On an individual level, inventors were then also able to share royalties
with the university, further adding to their profit incentives, and perhaps affecting
which experiments were pursued. 113 Together, these factors, among others, have
changed patenting activity and the research business at universities.
B. Universities Profit From Patent Licenses

The Bayh-Dole Act can be seen as a mandate to universities to obtain patents and
commercialize their inventions, a mandate that universities have taken seriously over
the last twenty years. 114 Its impact on the business of university research is enormous.
While in 1981 universities were awarded 436 patents, by 2001 that annual figure
climbed to 3,203. 115 Sizeable revenues have also accompanied the growth in university

107. Id. § 202(c)(4) ("With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the Federal
agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced
for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world .... ").
108. See id.
109. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1018.
110. See Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to
Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 378-79 (1992).
111. See generally Valoir, supra note 101.
112. See I National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2002, at 0-11 (2002), available
at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/pdf7volumel .pdf. In the early l 960s, the federal government began
a trend of compensating for a continually shrinking share of federal research and development funds. By
1979, the federal share fell below fifty percent and declined even more steeply during the 1990s. Since the
second half of the 1980s, federal research and development actually declined after adjusting for inflation.
Additionally, federal research and development was essentially flat during the past decade. Id.; see also
Michel, supra note 110, at 379.
I 13. See Michel, supra note I 10, at 380.
114. See Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note 100, at 19-21.
115. See 2 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, A5-l 03, A5-l 05 (2004),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sceind04/pdf _ v2.htrnl [hereinafter National Science Board 2004].
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patents: 16 In 1997, universities earned about $500 million in gross revenues from
patents. 117 A 2002 survey of 156 colleges and universities revealed that the institutions
earned almost $1 billion in combined licensing revenues that year. 118
One need look no further than the biotechnology industry over the last few years
to see the strong influence of university patent ownership. "[T]he biotechnology
industry as we know it today began on university campuses in the United States." 119
Universities have served as sources of numerous patent biomedical inventions as well
as founders or affiliates of start-up firms based on their patents. 120 Public and private
universities receive about one billion dollars in gross license revenues from their
intellectual property. 121 For instance, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
received $5.5 million in licensing fees in 1991. 122 These figures illustrate the increasing
collaboration between university research and private enterprise that the Bayh-Dole
Act was meant to achieve.
C. Universities Enforce Their Patent Rights

Along with the growth in their patent portfolios, universities have aggressively
enforced their patents in court. Many of these lawsuits have led to very large settlement
or damages awards. A few are mentioned here. The University of California sued
Genentech and settled for $200 million. 123 The University of Minnesota sued Glaxo
W ellcome and won a $300 million settlement. 124 Emory University just recently
collected $540 million in royalty fees (believed to be the largest settlement for a
university to date) to settle litigation on some drug patents. 125 Several other universities
including Cornell University, 126 Columbia University, 127 Harvard, 128 the Massachusetts

116. Universities with highly successful patents realize larger profits than most other institutions, whose
licensing revenues tend to constitute a smaller part-approximately four percent---0f their budget. See Amy
Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University
Innovations, 20 BERKELEYTECH.L.J. 103 I, 1087-88 (2005).
117. I National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000, at 6-5 7 (2000), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind00/c6/c06.pdf(During 1989-90, the reported income flows from licenses
totaled a mere $82 million, reaching $483 million in 1997.).
I 18. Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM Licensing Survey: FY 2002 62 (Ashley J. Stevens ed.,
2003), available at http://www.autm.net/events/file/surveys/02 _abridged_ survey.pd[ [hereinafter AUTM
Licensing Survey]; see also Susie Poppick, Yale Keeps Patent Stats Secret, YALEDAILYNEWS, Dec. 8,
2004, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=27658.
119. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note JOO,at 3.
120. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation,
in Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy 285,286 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Walsh et al., Effects].
121. AUTM Licensing Survey, supra note 120, at 62.
122. Michel, supra note I I 0, at 380 n.59.
123. Marcia Barinaga, Genentech, UC Settle Suit for $200 Million, 286 SCIENCE1655 (1999).
124. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1036 (D. Minn.
I 999).
125. Meredith Hobbs, A $540M Payday Caps Patent Fight, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 8.
126. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370F.3d 1354, 1359(Fed. Cir. 2004)(action
for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including Creative Technologies, Inc., a representative of the
University of Colorado and Cornell University).
127. In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 18, 18 (D. Mass. 2004).
128. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly& Co., No. 02-11280-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3170, at *1-*2
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Institute of Technology, 129 and University of Rochester 130 have also sued to enforce
their patents. Sometimes, a university may even appear as a co-plaintiff with a
corporation on one patent and a defendant against it on another.131 In 2004, the
University of Colorado and Cornell University were awarded a $2.1 million judgment
and $4.5 million in damages and interest against Laboratory Corporation of America. 132
Interestingly, universities do not appear to be suing each other for patent
infringement. 133

D. Relationships with Industry
Universities are now partners and collaborators with industry. For instance, a few
years after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, a study revealed that industry funded about
twenty-five percent of all biotechnology research at universities. 134 Today, that number
has likely increased in all areas. 135
Companies enjoy this access to university researchers as it enhances their
competitive position. Industry involvement takes various forms: (i) the university
could be under contract to conduct specific experiments; (ii) the university could provide continuing education to a company's researchers; (iii) the university could have
a grant directed at a specific researcher or project; (iv) the university may form a
review board that includes corporate members to decide which university projects will
be funded; or (v) the university's professors may enter commercial ventures (such as
starting companies or partnering with venture capitalists to commercialize research). 136

(D. Mass. Mar. 3, 2004) (action for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including MIT and Harvard).
129. Mass. Inst. ofTech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1007 (D.
Mass. 2003); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Speedera Networks, Inc., No.02-10188-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15903, at *1-*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002).
130. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216,220 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
131. Compare Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. IP 02-0512-C-B/S, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14724, at *2-*3 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004) (action by Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent
infringement with MIT as an involuntary plaintiff), with Ariad Pharms., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3170,
at* 1-*2 (action by MIT against Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent infringement). As a general rule,
a patent owner must join the exclusive licensee of the patent in any infringement action brought by the
licensee. See Erbamont Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387,393 (D. Del. 1989).
132. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Arn. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. See infra Part IV.C. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be
declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid (after
the university has filed or threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Nos.
93-1253, 94-1079, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23902, at *I (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 1994); New Star Lasers, Inc.
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
134. David Blumenthal et al., Industrial Support a/University Research in Biotechnology, 231 SCIENCE
242, 244 (I 986).
135. Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed
Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 453,479 (1997).
136. Michel, supra note 110, at 38 I.
All of the earliest genetic engineering companies were founded by professors who completed
the initial research in university laboratories. For instance Genentech, co-founded by Herbert
Boyer to exploit the Cohen-Boyer gene splicing patent, did not have a laboratory in its early
stages, so Boyer's campus laboratories at UCSF were used.
Id. at 382.
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LIVEON

Despite the cries ofimpending doom, the Madey decision does not signal the death
of research and innovation in universities. In reality, the decision will probably have
137
little effect on the way researchers conduct their day-to-day business. This is mostly
because the research marketplace will continue to guide and control the conduct of
researchers and patent-holders (especially considering the frequent role reversal of
these parties), thus providing an appropriate balance between enforcing patent rights
and allowing innovation. In a recent survey, none of the respondents reported having
to discontinue projects because of problems involved in obtaining intellectual property
rights for their research. 138 Instead, they have adopted "working solutions" to
intellectual property issues in their research. 139
One of the ironies of the controversy surrounding the experimental use exception
is that the Madey decision is both a blessing and a curse for universities. On the one
hand, universities criticize the narrowness of the exception, particularly its elimination
of the long held ( albeit erroneous) belief in their immunity from patent infringement
for research activities. On the other hand, however, as major patent-holders,
universities benefit from a strict and narrow interpretation of the exception. Millions
of dollars in licensing revenues and royalties would be lost, for instance, if all research
were exempted from infringement until commercialized.
There are several considerations, discussed more fully below, that alone and in
conjunction effectively self-regulate the business of university research. These factors
permit university researchers to experiment without much fear of suit, particularly
where their activities are not commercial or profit-making in nature. Further, the
innovation process in practice, especially to the extent that universities are involved,
is not one of exclusive competition but rather one of cooperation and sharing of
research information. 140 Together, these factors ensure that research and innovation will
continue to thrive.

13 7. See Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research After
Madeyv. Duke University, 79N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1552-{i2 (2004)(discussing how non-legal solutions
protect university research).
138. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE1021 (2003)[hereinafter
Walsh et al., Working].
139. Id. These solutions include (i) obtaining licenses from patent-holders, (ii) developing and
participating in public and quasi-public databases that make information available, (iii) inventing around
patents, (iv) going overseas, (v) filing suit against patent-holders (e.g., seeking a declaratory judgment), and
(vi) using the technology without a license (a practice that is admittedly very common among university
researchers). Id.
140. Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, I 00 YALE L.J. 2169, 2181 ( 1991 ). Obviously, there are occasions when the general culture of
sharing breaks down. In Madey v. Duke University, for instance, Madey chose to sue his former employer,
rather than allow it to continue to use his lasers. 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002). While we may not
be privy to the specific motivations and deliberations in that case, one can imagine that there may have been
underlying difficulties in their relationship, perhaps leading to, or as a result of, Madey's separation from
employment with the university. Absent these kinds of tensions, however, the spirit of cooperation ought
to prevail.
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A. The Effect of Merck v. Integra

The ultimate effect of the Merck opinion on the common law experimental use
exception is that it provides a wide exemption that serves to enlarge the experimental
use exception when the research involves a use protected under the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 141 Interestingly, one of the beneficiaries of the opinion will be universities. To the
extent the opinion can be read as permitting all drug experimentation, not only for
generics but for pioneer drugs as well, 142 research universities benefit directly when
their research includes the development of new drugs. Moreover, because the safe
harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act extends not only to submissions to the
FDA but also to research reasonably related to submission under a federal program,
Merck casts a wide net of exemptions, all to the benefit of research universities. 143
Granted, the opinion does not eradicate the narrow effects under Madey, in that it does
not cover all of the kinds of research that may be conducted at universities, but it does
provide some immunity to areas that heretofore would not have been protected under
the experimental use exception.
B. Licensing: Just Ask Nicely

It has become commonplace among university researchers to use patented devices
without seeking a license. 144 At the risk of stating the obvious, university researchers
(like all others) need to ask for a license in order to use a patented invention as
required by law. Although additional costs may accompany such a request, to complain
about those costs does not provide a sufficiently compelling reason to grant an
exception. Just as a long-time tax evader earns no sympathy when the time arrives to
make payments to the Internal Revenue Service, universities' complaints about now
having to pay licensing fees are unpersuasive.
Licensing is a routine and integral part of the intellectual property business. 145
Indeed, most universities already have technology transfer offices that handle
intellectual property issues, including licensing arrangements, 146 with an indicator of
success measured by licensing revenue. 147 Granted, seeking out and obtaining licenses
may prove cumbersome; however, such difficulty in and of itself should not serve as
a reason for noncompliance. 148

I 41. See supra Part 11.C.1.
142. A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer drug. See
Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., 934 F. Supp. 925, 931 (N.D. III. 1995).
143. The Act has already been interpreted to cover medical devices. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661,664,679 (1990).
144. Walsh et al., Working, supra note 138, at 1021. In the Walsh study, all of the university respondents
admitted using patented research tools without permission at times.
145. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., An Overview of the Virginia UC/TA, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. I, 8 (2001),
available at http://law.richrnond.edu/jolt/v8il/articlel.htrnl.
I 46. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 116, at 1080-81.
147. Id. at 1085.
148. Universities may be able to devise a relatively accessible procedure for their researchers to obtain
licenses by posting guidelines or forms on their websites. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. System of Intellectual
Property Reference Page, http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/index.htrn
(last visited Mar.
6, 2007).
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Further, the fear that research will be hampered because researchers will need to
spend all their time tracking down patents and negotiating licenses is misplaced. In
practice, very few licenses need to be negotiated on any given project. 149 Although
many potentially applicable patents may need to be reviewed at the outset, of those,
only a few will actually be relevant, and in the end, a handful or less will need to be
licensed. 150 With respect to costs, universities also have an advantage in that many
patent-holders provide discounted licenses to universities, often for less than half the
market rate. 151
There also does not appear to be any evidence that patent-holders will impede
research by unreasonably refusing to grant licenses to universities. 152 To the contrary,
denied access to intellectual property rights very rarely leads to the termination of a
worthwhile project. 153 Rather, other considerations, such as lack of confidence in the
technical success of the project, market demand, and limited internal resources,
account for the decision to discontinue a project. 154 Even in the rare instance where a
project might be terminated because of licensing difficulties, one commentator has
suggested that the social cost of not pursuing projects is low, given the vast array of
other available projects. 155
Another market force facilitating cooperation among researchers seeking licenses
is the repetitive nature of the licensing game. A licensing negotiation between a
university and a patent-holder is often not a one-time event; the parties may find
themselves in the future negotiating (or may already have negotiated) other patents,
and it is important that they show respect for the quid pro quo by maintaining a good
relationship and remaining reasonable. 156
Licensing could have avoided the litigation in both Madey and Merck. In Madey,
Duke argued that it had a license under grants received by the federal government, but
none of the pertinent contracts defined the scope of these rights. 157 Accordingly, the
university's rights to the invention were not clearly delineated. The better practice
would have entailed negotiating a license from Madey, the inventor, to Duke at the
outset ofMadey's employment. 158 In Merck, the parties attempted but failed to reach
a license agreement. 159 To the extent such failure occurred because the patent-holder

149. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 294.
150. Id. at 294-95.
151. Weschler, supra note 137, at 1553-55.
152. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177,219 (1987); Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 1103.
153. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 298.
154. Id. at 298, 304. One respondent in the Walsh survey said, "I am hard pressed to think of a piece of
research that we haven't done because of blocked access to a research tool." Id. at 298.
155. See id. at 305.
Some respondents have suggested that the value of targets has actually declined substantially
because companies can't exploit all of the targets they have, and so firms are more willing
to license some of their targets, or abandon some of their patents and Jet the inventions shift
to the public domain, because maintaining large portfolios oflow-value patents is expensive.
Id. at 305.
I 56. Id. at 326.
157. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
158. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
159. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860,863 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 301 2007

302

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

was unreasonable, it provides a lesson to patent-holders in licensing negotiations: be
cooperative, or you may Jose big, not only in the eventual outcome, but also through
the very expensive and risky litigation process. 160
The National Academy of Sciences (the Academy), which has no legal authority
but wields influence over particular scientific journals, issued a decree in early 2003,
urging, among other things, the licensing of patented materials. 161 The organization
also encourages patent-holders to issue equal license fees to everyone, regardless of
whether the request comes from academia or industry because "[t ]here is no clear line
between the 'for-profit sector' and 'academic' research." 162 When granting exclusive
licenses to industry, however, universities must be mindful that they may want to
reserve some of their rights in order to permit future licensing to those in the academic
community. 163 While it is too early to tell if the scientific community will abide by its
own policy, the Academy's decree reflects a sign of the cooperative spirit that
underlies academic research.
C. Tolerating Universities ' Patent Infringement

Madey is the first case in which a university was sued for patent infringement. 164
That telling statement supports my argument that universities are not likely to be sued
for infringement. Even in Madey, the facts are unusual because the case arose not out
of the typical situation where a competitor sues another, but out of an employeremployee dispute. 165
The points below help to explain why universities are unlikely to be sued for
patent infringement. Indeed, universities tend to ignore notification of infringement
letters, particularly when they are not engaging in commercially related research. 166
One commentator notes that "[s]o long as the university is not generating revenue
based on the patented technology, universities appear to be largely left alone, although
some firms will send letters." 167 Universities are also not inclined to sue each other,
especially when the alleged infringer is not commercializing the innovation. 168

160. For many plaintiffs, the risk that the patent at suit will be invalidated is a high and very real risk.
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
(invalidating the university's drug patent).
161. Committee on Responsibilities of Authorship in the Biological Sciences, Nat'!. Acad. Sci., Sharing
Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibilities of Authorship in the Life Sciences 7 (2003),
available at http://fermat.nap.edu/books/0309088593/htmVRl
.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
I 62. Id. at 67.
163. See Kapczynski et al., supra note I 16, at 1076.
164. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be declaratory judgment actions
where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid (after the university has filed or
threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1835, 1836
(Fed. Cir. 1994); New Star Lasers & Laser Aesthetics, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see also supra note 124.
165. Usually the employer retains the patent rights to inventions, but in this case the inventor owned the
rights. When he changed employers, there was no license given to the new employer. See RONALD B.
HILDRETH,PATENTLAW: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE§ I :8.5 (3d ed. 1999).
166. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 317.
167. Id. at 319.
168. See id. at 327.
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1. The Honor System
Common sense dictates that it is simply not possible for patent-holders to monitor
the activities of researchers and scientists in their private labs. The system relies on an
honor system of sorts requiring the researchers themselves to come forward, seek out
the patent-holder, and ask for permission. When research becomes public (generally
through publication) and/or commercialized, infringement becomes easier for a patentholder to detect. In addition, many researchers may choose to wait until that time to
seek permission from patent-holders. 169 In some cases, the six-year statute of
limitations 170 may expire before infringement is even discovered. 171

2. Difficulties of Litigation
While in theory it may appear easy (based on the definition of infringement) for
a patent-holder to vindicate her rights where a university or other party has infringed
them, the reality is far different. This is due to the costs, both financial and otherwise,
of patent litigation. For starters, a potential plaintiff contemplating filing suit must
consider the time and cost involved; such a suit may not be resolved for years and
could cost millions of dollars in attorney's fees alone, with no guarantee of success. 172
It is also important that the patentee be able to recover significant damages in
order to make this endeavor worthwhile. Thus, where a patented invention, although
infringed, has not generated profits or proven commercially successful, it simply does
not make sense to pursue aggressively an infringement claim. This grants universities
de facto immunity for purely research-related infringement activities that do not
generate revenues for the institution.
In addition to the time and energy one expends worrying about each step of the
case, there is also the time drain on all the individuals associated with the patented
invention. For instance, everyone in the patent-holder's organization may be involved
in discovery, searching and copying years of files and preparing and responding to
written and oral discovery. 173 The patentee also takes the risk that the patent at suit will
be invalidated, an occurrence that is not uncommon. 174

3. University Relationships Are Important
For a host of intangible reasons, a culture of not suing universities appears to exist.
In part, potential litigants fear that such suits will result in bad publicity because "it is

169. See Richard C. Levin et al.,Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
783, 807 (1987).
170. 35 u.s.c.§ 286 (2000).
171. Walsh et al., Working, supra note 138, at 1021; see also DavidJ.F. Gross & Lee Pulju, Ten Things
lo Consider Before Sending a Patent Infringement Warning Letter, 15 J. PROPRJET ARY RTS. 12, 13 (2003 ).
172. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 315.
173. See id.
174. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205-07 (1998) (finding that forty-six percent of patents were invalidated in cases
litigated between 1989 to 1996).
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECON.
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not good form to sue researchers in academic institutions and stifle their progress." 175
Industry also has much to gain by developing trusting relationships with university
researchers. 176
Some scientists even admitted that they welcome a low level of patent
infringement because such "background infringement" can contribute to the value of
their invention by generating interest in the new technology. 177 This is because of the
belief that those who utilize a particular new technology to solve a research problem
are likely to continue to use that technology-and share it with others-in the future.
Thus, when the "background infringement" becomes too great, the patent-holders
assert their property rights against the infringers by offering a license to use the
invention. The infringing scientists are then forced either to obtain a license for the
technologies they have used in their research methods or search for new methods to
solve the problems. 178

4. Sovereign Immunity for State Universities
A narrow experimental use exception poses an even lower threat of impending
doom to academic researchers given the immunity conferred on a significant number
of universities because of their status as public institutions. 179 Trying to avoid this
result, Congress (using its Article I powers) passed legislation in 1992 that expressly
abolished sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for states and state
employees who engage in patent infringement. 180 In 1999, however, the Supreme Court
held the law unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank. 181 The Court reasoned that state sovereign immunity
can be abrogated only under the Fourteenth Amendment, not under Congress's Article
I powers. 182 Since Congress did not provide a basis under the Fourteenth Amendment
for abolishing state immunity from patent infringement liability, the law was
unconstitutional. 183 Accordingly, state entities, including state universities, are immune
from patent infringement suits.

175. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 325.
176. In the Walsh survey, one respondent from a private firm noted:
We rely on lots of outside collaborations with academic labs. Our scientists want to feel on
good terms with the academic community. If you start suing, it breaks down the good
feeling. We give out our research tools for free, frequently. All we ask is, if you invent
anything that is directly related to the tool, you allow us the freedom to practice.
Id. at 326.
177. See id.
178. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON.463,463 (1995).
179. Approximately forty percent of degree granting postsecondary institutions are public. See THOMAS
D. SYNDERETAL.,U.S. DEP'T OFEDUC.,DIGESTOFEDUCATION
STATISTICS
2003, at 310 tbl.246 (2004),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005025.pdf( degree-granting institutions, by control and type of
institution: 1949-1950 to 2002-2003).
180. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106
Stat. 4230, 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000)).
181. 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999).
182. Id. at 637.
I 83. Id. at 639-43.
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This ruling is particularly significant here because public universities sit front and
center in patenting activity. Approximately sixty percent of the patents issued to
universities in 2001 went to public universities. 184 Thus, their immunity from
infringement damages is very significant. For all practical purposes, these universities
essentially have wide latitude to infringe, and patent-holders have little recourse. 185 An
experimental use exception-narrow or broad-has less impact on state universities
as defendants because, unlike their private counterparts, they are insulated. 186 They are
in the rare and enviable position of having the best of both worlds: they can sue others
for patent infringement but cannot be sued for the same practice.
Allowing state universities sovereign immunity from patent infringement may have
the unforeseen consequence of indirectly granting immunity to private industry
collaborators who shift resources to the university for just such protection. 187 It is
currently unknown what level of state funding or control will make a collaborative
endeavor an instrumentality of the state (and thus protected under state immunity),
rather than a disguised extension of the private industry collaborator. 188
V.

THE EXEMPTION

Is

APPROPRIATELY

NARROW

This Article does not support a judicial broadening of the experimental use
exception. In order for the exception to remain limited and thereby make meaningful
a patent-holder's rights to exclusivity, the exception must be kept narrow. To do
otherwise would risk enlarging the exception to a point where it swallows the rule
prohibiting patent infringement. Even recognizing that, as with most rules, there may
be a sufficiently compelling reason to create an exception to the exception, there has
been no evidence presented indicating why research universities deserve special
treatment in this area. To the extent that the business of a university, as it pertains to
research, has become indistinguishable from the business of a commercial research lab,
it seems only fair that the rules should apply equally to both.
Infringement is not a matter of degree. Courts have made clear that there is no
such thing as de minimis infringement. 189 Thus, any exceptions to infringement should
be similarly specific and not open to a question of degree or to an evaluation of merit.
In particular, where a university has infringed a patent through its research activities,

184. National Science Board 2004, supra note 115, at A5-105. The top ten patenting public universities
from 1991 to 200 I were University of California, University of Texas, University of Wisconsin, University
of Florida, State University of New York, University of Michigan, Iowa State University, University of
Minnesota, Michigan State University, and University of Washington. Id.
185. However, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, state workers may be sued in federal court in their
individual capacity. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908); see also Peter S. Menell, Symposium

on New Direction in Federalism: Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement
of Federallntellectual Property Rights, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2000). Further, although patentholders cannot obtain monetary compensation from the state, they may obtain injunctive relief. See id.
However, injunctive reliefagainst a state university under Eleventh Amendment state immunity would still
make litigation expensive and time-consuming. Id.
186. For further discussion about state universities' immunity from intellectual property claims, see Traci
Dreher Quigley, Comment, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of2003 Is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2004).
187. Mueller, supra note 3, at 33-34.
188. See id. at 36.
189. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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it should not be up to the courts to decide and assess the nature of the infringement, the
intent of the researcher, or whether the infringement led to the discovery of a
commercially viable product. 190
Moreover, a broad experimental use exception would provide disincentives to
invest in patenting and innovation. Weakening a patentee's control over her patented
invention deprives her of the pecuniary benefits associated with the patent, thus
reducing the returns from her investment in the invention. Further, a broad exception
would also discourage investors from devoting capital resources to research and
development projects that could have yielded future returns from a patent. 191

A. Patenting Promotes Innovation and the Public Good
Innovation is important not only for commercial profits but also because it
advances the public good. The patent system encourages innovation by rewarding the
substantial investments necessary for research and development. It promotes invention
by granting the inventor an exclusive right to exclude others from her invention and
giving her the ability to profit from it. Patenting also leads to greater efficiency by
encouraging the invention of new and better products. 192
In addition, the patent system promotes the development and commercialization
of inventions. There are several stages between the initial invention of a product and
the commercial development of the product to a point where it is ready for market.
Getting from one point to the other is costly and risky. 193 By preventing others from
using the invention for a certain period of time, the patent system permits the inventor
to recoup the costs of developing the product. But for these exclusive rights, free-riders
may take advantage of other's inventions, without having expended the resources for
development. 194 Free-riding can hurt the inventor's ability to realize a return on her
investment. 195
The disclosure required by the patent system 196 is a further benefit to society. It
requires inventors to make information publicly available that ordinarily would remain
undisclosed as a trade secret. This benefits both the public and the inventor. It benefits
the public by helping to avoid needless duplication of efforts. 197 For instance, a
competitor may learn the results of a certain experiment and be more accurately
informed about whether to pursue the project. Competitors also learn through patent
disclosures what technology is available for licensing and cross-licensing, leading to
a more efficient option than developing the technology itself. 198

190. Any such analysis should be legislatively defined, as in the Hatch-Waxman Act. See infra Part V.D.
191. See Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, 100 YALEL.J. 2169, 2181 (1991).
JR., PATENTAND ANTITRUST LAW 2-3 (1973).
192. WARDS. BOWMAN
193. Michel, supra note 110, at 392.
194. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.265, 266
(1977).
195. See Ben T. Yu, Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J.L. & ECON.215, 237
(1981).
196. 35 u.s.c.§ 112 (2000).
197. See Michel, supra note 110, at 392-93.
198. See id. at 395-96.
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As to the inventor, were she to keep the information as a trade secret rather than
obtain a patent, she takes on greater risks. There is the risk, for example, of having the
information disclosed and losing the trade secret protection, as well as the risk that
someone else will independently develop the invention (in which case the inventor
would be without recourse ). 199 Weakening patent protection would lead more
inventors to choose trade secret protection, the secrecy of which does not promote
innovation. 200

B. The Case for Expansion Is Not Persuasive
For those who advocate expansion of the experimental use exception, the
underlying reason appears to be the belief that such expansion will promote progress
and innovation. Other than the theoretical supposition that a narrow experimental use
exception will lead to less innovation, there has been no demonstrable evidence that
such is the case in practice. Even major research universities concede that "the more
one limits the patent rights conferred by Congress, the less one promotes the progress
of science." 201 Similarly, the Patent and Trademark Office opposed legislation
broadening the experimental use exception because it would diminish the "strong
incentive provided by the patent system." 202
The status quo (a narrow experimental use exception) appears to have had a
positive effect on research and innovation. Our patent laws are based on the notion of
exclusivity and derive from the Constitution, which authorizes Congress "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 203 The
premise that a person will be motivated to innovate because the patent laws will reward
him for having expended the time and resources underlies our system. One need look
no further than the biomedical activity over the last two decades, for instance, to see
the impact that patents have had on innovation and commercialization. 204 Patents have
also proven critical to the large increase in biotechnology start-up companies over the
last few years, and it seems logical that they will continue to spur growth and
innovation in many areas. 205
The process of obtaining a patent is expensive and time consuming. 206 In order to
be worthwhile, the right to exclude others (and the attendant royalties and other
financial benefits) must be meaningful-it
cannot be so filled with holes and
exceptions that the benefit to the patent-holder is outweighed by the benefits to the
general public. At a minimum, allowing unlicensed use of a patent deprives the patent-

199. See id. at 391-92.
200. See id. at 396.
20 I. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note I 00, at 11.
202. H.R. REP.No. 101-960, at 8 n.25 (1990).
203. U.S. CONST.art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
204. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 285.
205. Id. at 286--87.
206. See Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility a/Copyright and Computer Software:
An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal/or a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 977,981 (1988)
(stating that obtaining a patent is an expensive process that can often take up to five years); see also
Raymond E. Vickery, Jr., The Laws and Outer Space: Intellectual Property, 4 J.L. & TECH.9, IO (I 989)
(noting that obtaining a patent can take a number of years and cost thousands of dollars).
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holder ofroyalties. The patentee is contributing something of value to research, even
if that contribution consists of negative information, such as findings indicating that
something does not work. 207
If the desire to expand the experimental use exception stems from general
dissatisfaction with the patent laws as they exist today, engaging the courts in that
battle is a misguided approach. If the system is in need of an overhaul, then reformers
should seek to overhaul the system (which seems best done legislatively) rather than
eviscerate the exemption. Strong patent enforcement is good for consumers because
it provides a valuable incentive for innovation. 208 As discussed below, Congress
should only step in to chip away the rights of patent-holders when it determines that
a compelling need has been established in a particular area.
C. The Scope of Proposals for Expansion Is Hard to Define

Among those who favor expansion, there does not appear to be a clear consensus
on the precise parameters of the infringement exemption. They seem to have a difficult
time defining precisely where to draw the line in the delicate balance between
protecting the patent-holder's rights and fostering research and innovation. 209 Should
the rule be that all research universities are exempt, that only research tools are exempt,
or that a particular type of research is exempt?
Some have proposed the rule that no patent infringement occurs as long as the
experimenter is an academic or other non-profit research institution. 210 However, if the
researcher develops a commercially patented invention, then the researcher should pay
royalties to the patent-holder for any patents used in the design. 211 These proposals fail
to clearly define or identify the point at which a commercialized product has been
created for the purpose of requiring the royalty payments. Would it occur at the
marketing stage, the product testing stage, the order solicitation stage, or some later
stage?
Given the ties between universities and industry discussed above, this expansion
may pose another problem by allowing corporations to circumvent the experimental
use exception due to their affiliation with a university on a particular project. In other
words, had the identical research been conducted in the corporation's laboratory, it
would have fallen outside of the experimental use exception. However, conducting the
same corporate-sponsored research in the university's laboratory provides a protective
cloak.
The proposals for expansion also appear to exempt from infringement a researcher
who uses a patented device for its intended purpose as a tool for conducting
research. 212 To allow this kind of infringement simply because the tool was used in a
university's research lab (the patentee's market) completely circumvents and

207. See Michel, supra note 110, at 395.
208. John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 715 n.84 (1990).
209. See, e.g., Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 667, 699-700 (1997); Caruso, supra note 5, at 220; Derzko, supra note 5, at 366---367;
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-146; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at I 106--08.
210. See, e.g., Barash, supra note 209, at 667, 699-700; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at I 106--08.
211./d.
212. See infra note 214.
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eviscerates one's patent rights. Even universities themselves who hold a large number
of these patented research tools would have to concede that, at the very least, such a
program would not be desirable because it would cause them to lose royalty payments.
Others have proposed or debated a compulsory licensing scheme, which includes
some variation of government mandated permission to use a patented device without
consent and the payment of royalties to the patent owner. 213
Finally, there has been much debate about biomedical research tools and precisely
how a special exemption should protect them. 214 It seems, however, that the notion of
allowing free research (i.e., without the alleged burdens of obtaining permission) and
later payment ofroyalties only if the research has led to a commercialized product is
already the de facto rule. It is highly unlikely that a patent-holder will discover
infringement or even sue an early stage researcher because, among other reasons, the
damages would prove too small to justify the cost of the litigation. 215 Rather, serious
negotiations between the researcher and the patentee occur toward the later stages of
the product development process, because at that point they both have greater reasons
and incentives to strike a deal. To the extent that university labs continue to resemble
their commercial counterparts, justifying special treatment for universities will become
even more difficult.
There is one further view that deserves discussion: the suggestion that, like
copyright law, there should be a fair use exemption to patent law.216 The doctrine of
fair use, part of the 1976 Copyright Act, permits others to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner without consent. 217 Thus, the argument would go, where use
occurs in the context of education, research, or other socially valuable activities, a fair
use exception to patent infringement (i.e., a broader experimental use exception) makes
sense. Even without undertaking an exhaustive review and analysis of the fair use
doctrine, however, it does not seem to be the kind of model that patent law should
emulate.
The fair use doctrine has been quite troublesome in copyright law and has
engendered extensive litigation (about ten times more cases than the experimental use

213. See, e.g., Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 666 (1988); Alan M. Fisch, Comment, Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34
JURIMETRICS
J. 295 (1994); Paul Gormley, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licenses and Environmental
Protection, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 131 (1993); Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46.
214. The research tool discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. However, for additional reference,
see, e.g., Derzko, supra note 5, at 347; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1084-86; Mueller, supra note 3, at 1;
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 81.
215. SeesupraPartIV.C.1-2.
216. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM.L.
REV. 1177 (2000).
217. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)).
The preamble to section 107 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section I 06, the fairuse ofa copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.
Id.
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exception). 218 Part of the reason for this problem is the ad hoc nature of the doctrine,
lacking precise definitions in order to remain flexible to adapt to new technologies on
a case-by-case basis. 219 It relies on the application of four broad and vague factors to
determine whether use is fair. 220 However, the application of these factors has led to
inconsistent and unpredictable results. In any given case, for instance, the majority and
221
It is to be expected that an
dissenting opinions may disagree on each factor.
experimental use exception that resembles the fair use doctrine will cause a tremendous
increase in litigation as parties and courts struggle to decide which activities are
covered by the exemption in any given case. Accordingly, for this reason alone, the fair
use doctrine does not present an efficient model.
It is also interesting to mention that when it comes to copying for educational use,
fair use cases mirror two of the experimental use trends presented in this Article. First,
when course packets are used for educational purposes, the commercial copy center
222
making the copies for profit is not allowed the fair use defense. This seems to
suggest the importance of profit or commercial motive as in the experimental use
exception cases. Second, publishers enforcing their copyrights are choosing to sue the
commercial copy centers who make the copies rather than the universities who are the
direct infringers. 223 Again, this pattern mirrors the de facto practice under the
experimental use exception.

D. Congress Should Expand the Exemption Only for Compelling Reasons
Any expansion of the experimental use exception should occur legislatively and
only where necessary. 224 Such legislative pronouncements, in conjunction with
subsequent judicial interpretation of legislative intent, offer the best method for
addressing any compelling public policy reasons for expansion of the doctrine. To

218. A search revealed that since the enactment of the doctrine on October 19, 1976, the courts have
decided 823 cases involving fair use claims (search parameters in LEXIS Federal & State Cases, Combined
database for "fair use and copyright" after I 0/19/76; conducted on 8/2/05). By comparison, during the
same time period, only 85 experimental use exception cases were decided (search parameters in LEXIS
Federal & State Cases, Combined database for "experimental use exception and not (statutory exemption
or prior use defense) and patent infringement" after I 0/19/76; conducted on 8/2/05).
219. See H.R. REP.No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis .... "); see also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. I 980) ("The doctrine of fair use ... permits courts to avoid rigid application
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster.").
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
221. For example, compare Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), with Justice Brennan's dissent.
222. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
223. See id. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko 's Graphics Corp., Kinko's paid the publishers $1,875,000
and was barred from supplying course packets for ten years. Judith Rosen, Kinko 's Re-enters Coursepack
Market, PUBLISHERSWEEKLY, Sept. 22, 2003, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/
CA324 l 09 .html? pubdate=9%2F22%2F2003&display=archive.
224. See lnfigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967,981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) ("[I]t is
up to Congress to decide whether there should be an infringement exemption for university-based research
laboratories.").
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date, Congress has not seen fit, and has indeed refused, to broaden the scope of the
experimental use exception to protect universities. 225 As this Article suggests, such
congressional refusal may be because the existence and definition of a true problem has
not been established. 226

1. Exemptions to Date
Rather, Congress has acted in specific instances to grant particular exemptions,
such as that granted to the pharmaceutical industry in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 227 This
process allows Congress to determine whether an endeavor is sufficiently compelling
and necessary for the public welfare that it trumps a patent-holder's rights. 228 The
provision for generic drugs, 229 medical devices, 230 and drug development in general ( as
now interpreted by the Supreme Court) has met such criteria. In addition, Congress has
also enacted an exemption for infringement of patented medical or surgical procedures. 231 Institutional status-the mere fact that an enterprise is a research university
-has not and probably should not fit the bill.

2. A Proposed Standard
Unfortunately, no clear indication of the objective reasons for these exemptions
appears to exist; there is no test that would guide the result on the next proposed
exemption. Even recognizing that congressional acts are part of a political process, not
guided by specific articulable criteria, Congress could benefit, nonetheless, from
standards by which to craft legislation on this issue. Further, Congress may also choose
to articulate standards that would allow courts to deal with experimental use exception
cases.
With that in mind, this Article recommends a test that generally balances the
individual patent-holder's rights to exclusivity against society's interests in using her
invention. More specifically, in deciding whether to permit infringement and bypass

225. See, e.g., Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st
Cong. (1990) (unsuccessful bill proposing exemptions from infringement for university research).
226. One legislator noted, ''The stated purpose of [the proposed legislation] is to protect university
research activity. I fail to understand what universities are being protected from. There has never been a
case, to my knowledge, where a university has been sued for patent infringement for carrying on research
on a patented invention." H.R. REP.NO. l 0 1-960(1) ( 1990).
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 27l(e)(l) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 906 (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000).
228. Congress may also require compulsory licensing in certain areas. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co.
v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574,577 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (I 969) (holding that
the FTC has authority to require compulsory licensing of tetracycline and aueromycin patents on a
reasonable royalty basis). In addition, the Clean Air Act provides for compulsory licensing of patents on
pollution control devices to those who cannot use substitutes to meet the statutory pollution guidelines. 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000).
229. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 27I(e)).
230. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,664 (1990).
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
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the patentee's rights, Congress should find that the patent-holder's refusal to license 232
the invention will have an injurious effect on the public welfare and on innovation.
To illustrate the test, it may be helpful to revisit the hypothetical posed at the
beginning of this Article with Ivan and his Gizmo. Assume that the researchers at the
local university believe that Ivan's Gizmo will be useful in finding a cure for cancer.
They seek a license from him, but he refuses. In fact, he refuses to license it to
anyone. 233 Ivan does not have the knowledge or the resources to use his device the way
the university researchers would. The matter is before Congress. 234
First, Congress should examine whether Ivan's refusal to license could have a
potentially injurious effect on the public welfare. Given the importance of finding a
cure for cancer, a compelling case for an affirmative response can be made here.
Second, Congress should ask if a compelling case can be made that the refusal could
have an injurious effect on innovation. Ivan, without the knowledge or resources,
cannot use his device to find a cure for cancer (he may not even suspect that it has any
connection to cancer). He hinders innovation (i) by not having the ability to research
and develop a potentially momentous technology and (ii) by refusing to permit anyone
else to invent the technology. Accordingly, this situation would justify Congress
curtailing Ivan's rights, 235 and either forcing him to license the technology2 36 or
declaring that use of the device for research is not an act of infringement where it has
been shown that such use would constitute a necessary step of a protocol for finding
a cure for cancer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Madey court's narrow interpretation of the experimental use exception is
consistent with precedent, consistent with public policy, and appropriate for university

232. Requiring that the prospective infringer seek a license first is in keeping with respect for patent
rights. It seems fair that the patent-holder have something akin to a right of first refusal on the patented
invention before having Congress decide to curtail or abrogate those rights. This arrangement also permits
the marketplace to govern the transaction. See supra Part IV.B.
233. In reality, Ivan's refusal to license would be highly unusual. He would have so much to gain from
participation in finding a cure for cancer through royalties, licensing fees, and possible ownership interests
in the cure, that it would make very little sense to refuse. See supra Parts IV.B-C. Assuming, however, that
he either refuses to license or seeks draconian terms and that there is no other alternative to using his
invention, then it is fair for the public, through Congress, to step in.
234. Admittedly, Congress (unlike the courts) generally does not deal with an individual situation.
However, for purposes of the hypothetical, "Ivan" could represent a corporation or industry practice that
has created or is creating the kind of obstacle that would justify congressional intervention.
235. This could be seen as a consistent legislative corollary to the policy supporting the defense of patent
misuse. Although a patentee's refusal to license does not constitute misuse of the patent, to the extent the
behavior has anticompetitive effects on the market, the patent may be held unenforceable. See generally
ROGERE. SCHECHTER
& JOHNR. THOMAS,INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY:
THELAW OFCOPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS
ANDTRADEMARKS§ 21.3, at 505-08 (2003).
236. This is, in effect, a kind of compulsory licensing. However, unlike other proposed compulsory
licensing schemes, this approach is more specific and limited in terms ofits scope. For instance, it does not
apply to all research tools. Cf supra note 213. Moreover, it requires, as a threshold matter, consideration
of the effect on the public welfare and on innovation in the particular circumstances. It also grants the
patent-holder an opportunity to negotiate freely with the prospective licensee before facing the blanket
imposition of a compulsory license.
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research. Given the nature ofuniversity research today and its resemblance to industry
research, it does not seem fair that universities should receive special treatment from
infringement simply by virtue of their being universities. In order to make a patentholder's right to exclude others meaningful, any attempt to broaden the activities that
are exempt from infringement under the doctrine must be done sparingly and only for
compelling reasons. Congress should consider expanding the exemption only in
situations where a compelling case has been made that a patent-holder's refusal to
license threatens the public welfare and innovation.
In practice, Madey will probably have very little effect on the way research is
conducted at universities. Even if researchers may technically be engaging in patent
infringement in their labs (as had become commonplace before Madey), they are not
likely to suffer repercussions. There are various norms and considerations that greatly
favor and protect academic research in a way that will ensure its survival.
Finally, recent gaps have been created in the experimental use exception as a result .
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and because of state
universities' immunity from patent infringement. Far from leaving the doctrine as an
empty shell, however, these gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the
doctrine. The doctrine is still of consequence, for instance, to private universities,
individual researchers at state universities, industrial researchers, and the world of nondrug development researchers. Because each chip off the doctrine signals a further
erosion of patent-holders' rights and an accompanying harm to the incentives to invent
and innovate, careful consideration of the doctrine is still required.
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